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Abstract This paper outlines a reoccurring motif within the racist 
imaginary of (post)apartheid culture: the black body-in-pieces. This 
disturbing visual idiom is approached from three conceptual 
perspectives. By linking ideas prevalent in Frantz Fanon’s description of 
colonial racism with psychoanalytic concepts such as Lacan’s notion of 
the corps morcelé, the paper offers, firstly, an account of the black body-
in-pieces as fantasmatic preoccupation of the (post)apartheid imaginary. 
The role of such images is approached, secondly, through the lens of 
affect theory which eschews a representational ‘reading’ of such images 
in favour of attention to their asignifying intensities and the role they 
play in effectively constituting such bodies. Lastly, Judith Butler’s 
discussion of war photography and the conditions of grievability 
introduces an ethical dimension to the discussion and helps draw 
attention to the unsavory relations of enjoyment occasioned by such 
images. 
 
Keywords: Apartheid, body-in-pieces; fantasy; images, grievability; 
photography; racism 
 
“The horrible pornography of death” 
 
This paper focusses on a reoccurring motif within (post)apartheid 
culture. The motif in question, which occurs with disturbing regularity, 
and which I treat as the correlate of a social fantasy,1 is that of the 
(black) body-in-pieces. There are a great many variations on this theme - 
or more appropriately perhaps, this fixation – within the (post)apartheid 
social imaginary. It is a key figure in racist humour (for examples see 
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Godwin, 1996; Kilpatrick, 2010); in visual arts (Hill, 2005); in narrative 
retellings of apartheid experience (Hook, 2013); and in news-media 
(Krog, Mpolweni & Ratele, 2009) and photojournalism. I will limit myself 
here to the last sub-category of this general schema.  
Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva’s The Bang-Bang Club (2000) tells 
the story of a handful of Johannesburg-based photographers who risked 
their lives in capturing many of the most brutal scenes of township 
violence that occurred in the dying days of apartheid. Not all of these 
images were of bodily destruction, but many - and certainly the most 
iconic - were. This visual record of South Africa’s ‘hidden war’ amounts 
to a litany of acts of (black) bodily destruction. There are photographs of 
immolation; of men being hacked or beaten to death; of stabbings and 
mob violence; of mutilated corpses being carelessly loaded into trucks. 
Remarkably, for such a small group, two members of the ‘Bang-
Bang Club’ were awarded Pulitzer Prizes. Greg Marinovich won the Prize 
for Spot News in 1990 for a sequence of images depicting the murder of 
Lindsaye Tshabalala, a suspected Inkatha supporter who was stabbed 
and subsequently burnt alive. More notoriously, Kevin Carter won in 
1994, for a picture taken in Southern Sudan of a vulture that appeared 
to be stalking an emaciated, starving child. The fact that both images – 
which went on to receive worldwide press circulation – involved black 
bodies in states of immanent and/or horrific death seems telling. It 
indicates that the visual trope of the black body in states of destruction 
is not confined to (post)apartheid culture alone, but represents a point 
of fascination for a far broader global culture. This is not to imply that 
audiences were not appalled by such images (they were, as the backlash 
against Carter (Marinovich & Silva, 2000) for not doing more to secure 
the child’s safety made clear). It is simply to call attention to the fact 
that these were viable news-media images, photographs that, 
essentially, could be shown, and that in fact warranted acclaim.  
The same of course does not hold in the case of white (or 
European/US American) bodies in similar states of destruction. This 
point is made in Judith Butler’s (2009) discussion of the US news-media 
embargo on showing the bodies – even the coffins – of American 
soldiers during the Iraq war. The injunction underlying the embargo is 
clear enough: one does not circulate photographs of the destroyed 
bodies of those with whom a dominant group identifies. In such 
instances a prohibition on representation seems a necessary condition 
of respect. By contrast, and certainly within the (post)apartheid context, 
“instances of the desecration of the black body have yet to evoke 
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significant expressions of outrage…from the culture of “whiteness” 
(Ndebele, 2009, p. 10). “The white body is inviolable”, argues Ndebele, 
“and that inviolability is in direct proportion to the global vulnerability of 
the black body” (p. 17).  
I am arguing then that many of the images of the ‘Bang-Bang Club’ 
effectively pictured a fantasy, the (post)apartheid social fantasy of the 
destroyed black body. I am not suggesting that these images were 
somehow motivated by the unconscious racism of the photographers, or 
that there was any attempt on their part to extend apartheid’s 
ideological agenda. (In other instances, similar images certainly were 
deployed for ideological reasons by the apartheid state.2 Images of 
multiple injured or dead black bodies; the shooting of black protestors, 
or the unleashing of police dogs upon them; so-called ‘black on black 
violence’; the savagery of necklace murders - all of these were staples of 
apartheid news broadcasts which emphatically reiterated the schema of 
the abject black body). Quite the contrary, I pick these images precisely 
because of the anti-apartheid loyalties of the photographers. The pathos 
of their situation was that the very images they had hoped would 
threaten apartheid were often put to the use of implicitly justifying the 
system. As the film (2010) version of the Bang-Bang Club makes 
abundantly clear, these photographers were aware that the “horrible 
pornography of death” (Marinovich & Silva, 2000, p. 241) they were 
involved in had a role in mode of racist objectification. The importance 
of this example is that it shows the durability of an enduring social 
fantasy which persists despite the contrary political allegiances of the 
subjects involved in its picturing.  
Not only do such ‘schemas’ of social fantasy outstrip the conscious 
agency of its subjects, they also exhibit an uncanny ideological tenacity, 
returning after the apparent end of a given historical era. Take for 
example the terrible image of Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, a migrant 
worker from Mozambique, who was set alight and burnt to death in 
Ramaphosa township in 2008. For many, this macabre scene of the 
victimized Nhamuave, on his hands and knees, being consumed by 
flames, was the signature image of the outbreak of xenophobic violence 
that swept across South Africa in 2008. It evoked, in a case of the 
apparent circularity of history, images of the ‘necklacing’ murders of the 
1990’s which flooded the apartheid newsmedia.  
In her sensitive engagement with this image and Adze Ugah’s 
documentary The Burning Man (2008), which focuses on the life and 
death of Nhamuave, Strauss (2011) debates a series of ethical issues 
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pertaining to the iconisation of anonymous pain. The image, she 
concedes, could be linked to a tradition of “visualizing atrocity 
epitomised, during the apartheid era, in images of the victims [of 
violence] in the townships” (p. 117). Newspaper images, she continues, 
“commonly invite a measure of detachment”, yet “the cruel human 
suffering depicted in the image [of Nhamuave] arguably disrupts any 
attempt…to establish a comfortable distance” (p. 107). In Strauss’s 
perhaps optimistic view, Ugah’s documentary worked against “the 
tangle of media responses and images that reduce [Nhamuave]…to an 
archetype of corporeal suffering” (p. 107).  
It is worth providing one further current example of the trope of 
the destroyed black body so as to counter the contention that this is by 
now an outdated historical motif. Reporting on the Farlam Commission 
of Inquiry investigating the Marikana mine shootings, Poloko Tau (2012) 
observed that 
  
Image after image was beamed onto screens showing…sets of 
crime scene photos and images taken in the aftermath of the 
August 16 Marikana massacre…Some images showed bullet-
riddled bodies…others revealed dead miners with their hands 
cuffed (http://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/mining-
crisis). 
 
How then are we to understand the libidinal economy that underlies 
these images, the psychical dynamic that keeps them in circulation and 
that is itself – crucially - set in motion by the structural racism of the 
(post)apartheid context? Secondly, how are we to grapple with the 
affective intensity of such images which seems necessarily to outstrip 
the political effect of representation, indeed to exceed the signifying 
impact of image-as-text? Lastly, how might we think the ethical 
dimension of such photographs, and, perhaps more importantly yet, the 
ethical injunction that is, in effect, posed by them? I will turn to each of 
these questions in turn. 
 
Reading white fantasy 
 
One of the great strengths of Fanon’s (1952/1986) Black Skin White 
Masks lies precisely in its apparent exaggerations, which show how 
adept the young Fanon was, amidst his early enthusiasm for 
psychoanalysis, in reading white fantasy. Fanon uses the imagery of the 
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black body being broken apart, burnt, cut, exploded, eviscerated, 
describing such scenes with the notion of ‘corporeal malediction’.3  He 
was obviously deeply affected by accounts of lynching and related forms 
of physical racist violence, but his disturbingly eloquent descriptions, 
articulated in the vocabulary of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, go 
further than this. He taps into the just ‘beneath the surface’ imaginary 
quality of racist fantasy. Fantasy of this sort is not readily assumed or 
‘owned’ by the subject. It is not openly spoken of, or effectively 
‘subjectivized’; quite the contrary, the experiencing subject might be 
surprised, even repelled by the fantasy if it is rendered too clearly, in 
overly explicit forms. Nor for that matter is the fantasy wholly 
unconscious; it is more like a latent schema of understanding, a 
subliminal frame of apprehension through which black otherness comes 
to be understood.  
Fanon (1952/1986) is also profoundly aware of the idealizing 
aspect of such fantasies. These idealizations are entwined with 
stereotyping caricatures, so that apparently admirable qualities become 
reduced to racial vices: the perception of economic industriousness is 
thus transformed into ‘the Jew’s love of money’ (for detailed elaboration 
of Fanon’s argument, see Hook, 2011). What this postulate brings to 
light is the possibility that the (post)apartheid preoccupation with the 
black body-in-pieces maintains a ‘co-representative’, an additional 
fantasmatic component. I have in mind here the notion of the black 
body as strong, impervious, possessed of a formidable and superior 
physicality. This stereotypical trait, which might be recognized variously 
in irrational attributions of athleticism, bodily strength, vitality, natural 
physical endowment, is of course well-known trope of racism also in 
British and US contexts (St Louis, 2005; Stuart, 2005). The black body 
here becomes – perhaps unexpectedly – ‘phallic’: an emblem of 
strength, of power, of what the white subject has lost, or stands to lose.  
Our tentative analysis thus points to a twofold schema, an 
antinomy of fantasy. On the one hand: the phallic corporeality of black 
corporeality, the black body as epitome of physicality, as icon of vitality, 
as body in apotheosis. Yet, in contrast to such (distorted) idealizations, 
these bodies remain in perpetual proximity to death, to suffering; they 
are pictured in terrible states of duress, of dismemberment and violence 
that the white subject can never quite imagine for themselves. The 
fantasmatic black body exists thus in two irreconcilable scenes: as site of 
destruction (the body-in-pieces), and as image of physical perfection, 
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bodily exultation, site of exaggerated vitality.  Body in extremis coincides 
thus with the body in excelsis. 
Such a complex of coinciding images makes for fertile terrain 
within the racist (or racialised) imaginary, and affords a variety of 
dynamic explanations. One may understand the alternating components 
of this complex, this racist ‘archetype’, along the lines suggested by 
Mbembe’s (2001) discussion of the body of the colonized, in which an 
exaggerated physicality eradicates properties of agency, spiritual 
elevation, humanity: 
 
[I]n the colony the body of the colonized individual is 
considered, in its profanity, one object among others. Indeed, 
being no more than a “body-thing,” it is neither the substrate 
nor the affirmation of any mind or spirit…His cadaver remains 
lying on the earth in a sort of unshakable rigidity, a material 
mass and a simple, inert object, condemned in the position of 
that which plays no role at all (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 26-27).  
 
What is particularly useful about Mbembe’s contribution is that it links 
many of the above psychoanalytic theorizations of the body to a more 
overtly political dimension, that of key notions within the philosophy of 
colonial subjugation. 4 These ideas link back to a longstanding Fanonian 
theme: the delegation of the bodily. This is the idea that the crass 
corporeality of the body that a particular (racial/class) group disavows is 
projected upon another group, who is thus consigned to the position of 
abject racial other.  
Fanon’s concern is primarily with white attributions of the hyper-
sexuality of blacks, but we may extrapolate his idea to include the facet 
of excess corporeality, the dimension of the abject body. The factor of 
racialization here is impossible to ignore: the broken body, the suffering 
body, the repulsive body-in-pieces is always, certainly within apartheid 
culture, the black body. We can go one step further, and link this 
conceptualization to Lacan’s (2006) formulations regards the corps 
morcelé. In his seminal essay on the mirror-stage, Lacan notes that the 
“fragmented body…is regularly manifested in dreams”, particularly so 
under experiences of “the aggressive disintegration of the individual” (p. 
78). Of course, given the predominance of the social fantasy with which 
we are concerned here, it is apparent that such schemas of 
fragmentation are not equally distributed throughout all social groups. 
One would expect, in situations of radical social asymmetry, that such 
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imagery would be delegated to racial/cultural/class others who are then 
given the burden of acting as depository for all such values and all 
related anxieties of fragmentation. This would be to say that the white 
body-in-pieces in racist or (post)colonial culture is elided; it never comes 
into view; it is never present except in the displaced form of the abjected 
black body-in-pieces. 
 On the basis of the above theorizations we can offer at least two 
accounts of the dynamic relationship between the facets of the fantasy 
we are examining. Doing so enables us to speculate on the libidinal 
economy, that is, the distribution of affects, in these related scenes. We 
might begin by emphasizing the priority placed on the imagining of the 
black body-in-pieces in racist contexts, and stress the need for white 
subjects to revisit or visualize this image precisely as the displacement of 
the fragmentary experiences of the white body-in-pieces. Odd as it may 
sound, such images here would have a placatory function, soothing 
anxieties of dissolution by locating them in a site of pronounced dis-
identification. A societal fixation with such images, their incessant 
repetition within various forms of popular culture, can thus be 
understood along affective lines: such images glow with the gratification 
of respite, with the alleviation of anxiety, they make a tacit 
pronouncement: ‘White bodies are not destined for this fate’. 
 There is also an argument that such scenes visit upon their victims 
exactly the violence they are thought to deserve. One relies here on the 
notion of projection, the idea that the other comes to be the carrier of 
the repellant values that the racist subject has themselves discarded. 
One thus attacks the other, blames them, with vigor proportionate to 
the need to expel these attributes from the self. To this we may add the 
Lacanian thesis that such depictions play the part of a scene of 
(dis)identification. Lacan’s (2006) notion of the mirror stage specified 
that a double relation obtained between the subject and potential image 
of identification: the image is both jubilantly loved as a narcissistically-
gratifying object, and yet also hated inasmuch as it proves a destabilizing 
or rivalrous influence. Such images of black body-in-pieces are, as such, a 
pure imagining of hate. There is a wishfulness about them, as if they 
visualize a desire, perhaps like the picturing of a wish in a dream, albeit 
in a literal and unusually undisguised manner. 
 Despite that at first appearance these accounts may appear to 
contradict one another, they can in fact sit side-by-side. The ambivalent 
quality of such imaginings, which move between providing gratifying 
relief from anxiety, and further stimulating affective levels of anxiety and 
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aggression, is of the nature of fantasy itself. A Lacanian perspective on 
fantasy insists on this: fantasy oscillates between extremes of unease 
and domestication, staging both a prospective castration and a scene 
which shields the subject against just such a possibility. 
 
 
Exhibiting atrocity 
 
Before turning to a second theoretical perspective on the visual idiom of 
the black body-in-pieces, it helps to introduce a brief case-study of a 
particular image which in many instances can be taken as paradigmatic 
of the subset of images with which we are here concerned.  
On the 17th April 1988, the Afrikaans newspaper Rapport 
published a gruesome photograph of a severely mutilated black body on 
the front page of its Sunday edition. The image was thought to justify a 
two-page spread, and it appeared on both front and back covers of the 
newspaper, above the headline ‘Selfmoord Terro’s’ (i.e. ‘Terrorist kills 
himself’) and beneath the back page banner ‘Kamikaze-bom!’ (‘Kamikaze 
bomb!’). The image, which I have opted not to reproduce here, shows 
the remains of a man, a ‘terrorist’, who had been killed while attempting 
to prime a limpet mine, presumably intended for civilian targets.  
 The photograph graphically depicts the scene of a body-in-pieces. 
It shows a white man, no doubt an investigating officer, squatting over 
the remains; a dismembered leg lies some distance away from the 
bottom (left-side) half of the man’s abdomen. An inlay shows the man’s 
(right-side) upper body and his head, which is being cradled by another 
investigator. Neither of the man’s arms are intact, his face, while not 
recognizable, has been turned towards the camera – no attempt has 
been made to conceal his features. The text alongside the image reads 
as follows (my translation from Afrikaans): 
 
The gruesome scene of the first bomb explosion on Friday 
night at Sterland, Pretoria. The limpet-mine apparently 
exploded when the terrorist attempted to attach it to a car in 
the parking-lot. The photograph shows the power of the bomb 
that blew the man’s body to pieces (Rapport, 1988, p. 1).  
 
Subsequent research revealed the name and background of the man in 
the image. Oderile Maponya, aka ‘Mainstay’, was, at the time of his 
death a commander in MK (Umkhontu we Sizwe, the armed wing of the 
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African National Congress) (Pigou, 2003). Although little is recorded of 
Oderile’s background, the fate of his brother, Japie, featured as an 
important topic of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Japie was tortured and killed by apartheid security police operatives who 
were attempting to elicit information about Oderile’s whereabouts; 
Oderile was thought to be orchestrating a series of ‘terrorist’ activities 
within the Northern ‘Vaal triangle’ region of the country at the time.  
My intention here is not to embark on a sustained analysis of the 
pictorial codes and frame elements of this brutal image. Nonetheless, it 
is worth enumerating just a few of these elements, for they clearly play 
their part in redoubling the violence of an image which is perhaps the 
most explicit public picturing of the apartheid fantasy of the black body-
in-pieces. 
 The sensationalistic tone of the accompanying “kamikaze-bom!” 
byline accords the scene neither a sense of gravity nor of human tragedy 
or loss. This jaunty proclamation, taken alongside the sparse, even 
telegraphic textual description, succeeds in suspending the true horror 
of what has happened. More overt yet is the undoubted shock-value of 
the scene which holds its audience with the frisson of the macabre, 
indeed with the prurient quality of the grotesque, rather than with any 
real intimation of human loss. The audience is invited to be appalled, 
disgusted by a gruesome depiction which solicits nothing by way of 
sympathy or identification. The very excessiveness of the image’s 
contents as portrayed in such a forum – the man’s eviscerated torso, his 
horrendously deformed and scattered remains - betrays its ideological 
agenda, pronouncing: whites cannot be depicted like this; a black 
terrorist and enemy of the state, by contrast, can.  
It is tempting, in respect of this image, to apply Butler’s (2009) 
thesis that the interpretation of a photograph is wholly reliant neither 
upon the subjectivity of the viewer nor the narrative accompaniment of 
captions.  The photograph, she argues, is not merely an image awaiting 
interpretation. By delimiting what will count within the frame and 
 
by virtue of the structuring constraints of genre and form on 
the communicability of affect…the photograph itself becomes 
a structuring scene of interpretation (p. 67). 
 
One might expect thus that photographs of atrocity extend the 
brutalities they document. Indeed, “rather than merely referring to acts 
of atrocity, the photography builds and confirms these acts” (Butler, 
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2009, p. 70). In all of these respects, one might argue, this is a ‘scene 
that should not be seen’; the very act of recording it adds to its 
violence.5 
 This is not of course to discount the effect of the framing elements 
I have been discussing – quite the contrary. These formal elements, once 
taken in conjunction with the racialising lens of apartheid discourse - 
which presumably lent the image its ideological legibility - effectively 
erase the dead man’s status as human. This is perhaps the most 
obviously concerning aspect of the image: the dehumanization of the 
body which, depicted in such terms, can be offered no conceivable 
dignity, no respect for the dead. This anonymous, de-subjectivized body 
is more corpse than man, more waste matter (“”body-thing”…cadaver…a 
material mass” to quote Mbembe (2001, pp. 26-27)) than person.  
There are a number of further questions that one could ask, 
centering on the context and form of the image: why has it been used as 
the front-piece of an ostensibly family Sunday newspaper?; why the 
gratuitous (and no doubt further objectifying) double-page spread?; 
why, moreover, the front- and back-cover treatment reserved typically 
for major historical events? Interesting as these questions no doubt are, 
I wish to direct attention rather to the affective dimension of the 
picture, to the charge of jouissance associated with the image, that is, 
the prospect of the viewer’s relish in what is depicted.  
Although Butler (2009) does not make use of this psychoanalytic 
term, she does, like Sontag, stress the transitive nature of such 
photographs, underlining the fact that they relay affect, affirming also 
that the viewership of such atrocities may exult in what they see. This 
prospect of the – less than conscious – enjoyment to be gained in this 
image is of course variable, and it cannot be assumed in each viewer. 
That being said, such affective responses cannot, equally, be reduced to 
the subjective; they remain linked to symbolic co-ordinates, to the 
conditions of legibility of the apartheid context itself. In this case, the 
jouissance of the image is – at least in my reading - channeled toward a 
moralizing conclusion: this terrorist got what he deserved. Put 
differently, the illicit enjoyment ‘in’ the image is linked to its pragmatic 
function, the declaration it performs, that of intimidation, warning: this 
is what happens to terrorists.  
The Rapport image epitomizes all that Strauss (2011) hoped that 
the proper human contextualization of the Nhamuave image was able to 
transcend. It exemplifies the tradition of visualizing atrocity; it conveys 
not so much a sense of suffering as of obliterated humanity. As such it 
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provides an instance of moral desensitization in which a dead person is 
reduced to an emblem of corporeality - to a corpse – which is forever 
removed from the empathic range of the (white, apartheid) viewer. The 
body in this image is a veritable icon of dis-identification; the disgusted 
reaction it inevitably invokes seems to have the potential only to harden 
attitudes of distance and separation. 
 
In excess of representation 
The ‘turn to affect’ within contemporary social theory (Blackman & 
Venn, 2010; Clough & Halley, 2007; Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 2003) has 
given rise to a distinctive theorization of the affectivity of images. Work 
of this sort (Coleman, 2008, 2012, 2013; Featherstone, 2010; Latham & 
McCormack, 2009) ushers in a new and vital research field, one which 
avoids many of the presumptions of a ‘media effects’ model intent on 
gauging the impact of images upon bodies, each of which (images and 
bodies) is considered autonomous and easily separable from the other. 
These scholars expand upon the limitations inherent in a 
representational paradigm that treats images largely as descriptions of 
something else, and – as in the case of many discourse analysis and 
cultural studies approaches – as texts, that is, as carriers of ideology and 
discursive meaning that can be broken down and analysed so as to 
identify particular signifying relations and practices (Blackman & Venn, 
2010).  
This emerging tradition maintains that the affective force of an 
image, its ‘ambiance of sense’ as we might put it, outstrips the (not 
uncomplicated) complex of signifiers and discourses that it is thought – 
on the level of representation – to convey. As Alaimo and Hekman 
(2008) stress, the constant prioritization of ideology, discourse and 
representation has led not only to the neglect of the affective 
vicissitudes of experience, but also to that of the bodily-reactivity of 
images. As Featherstone (2010) insists: 
images of bodies in the media…may literally move us, make us 
feel moved, by affecting our bodies in inchoate ways that 
cannot easily be articulated or assimilated to conceptual 
thought (p. 195).  
Featherstone cites Massumi’s (2002) insistence on the primacy of the 
affective in image reception and goes on to stress that the body-image 
possesses presence. There is, furthermore “an unstructured non-
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conscious experience transmitted between bodies”, and between body-
images and bodies, we might add, “which had the capacity to create 
affective resonances below the threshold of articulated meaning” 
(Featherstone, 2010, p. 199). 
 Featherstone’s argument seems particularly applicable in the case 
of the disturbing order of images we have been considering. What is 
being advanced then is a mode of engagement with images which 
prioritizes affect over signification, sense over meaning, and direct 
experience over processes of reading. Coleman’s (2013) distinction is 
helpful: images work not only through what they depict, but how they 
are felt in and through the body. What follows from this is attention not 
to representational content, but to the resonances and experiences 
images induce in bodies. That is to say, staying with Coleman, “Images 
are…intensively experienced rather than intensively read…images are 
felt and lived out” (2013, p. 1). Hence the new research objective of 
grasping not only the experiential intensity of images, but grappling also 
with how such ‘pre-signifying affective materiality’ is felt in bodies 
(Latham & McCormack, 2009). We need thus to approach images in 
terms of their ability to generate bodily intensities, to arouse or inflame, 
indeed – harking back to psychoanalytic terminology used above - to 
engender effects of jouissance, to incur modes of libidinal investment or 
response. 6 
Importantly, what is being argued here moves beyond the (fairly 
intuitive) contention that images of bodies frequently have a visceral 
impact upon viewing subjects. While this much is true, one needs also 
tackle a more paradoxical assertion, namely that bodily-affecting images 
are, in a very important sense, not strictly separable from the bodies 
within which they induce reactions. This begs further explanation. What 
would it mean then, to say with Coleman (2008), that “A body is not a 
human subject who has relations with images…rather a body is the 
relation between….a human subject and images” (p. 168)? 
Let me offer a few reflections on Deleuzian ontology (Deleuze, 
1992; Deleuze & Parnet, 2002) – clearly a vital influence on Coleman’s 
own work - so as to contextualize the argument in question. The overlay 
of body and image,7 their effective inseparability, is not well served by 
speaking of a ‘relation’. ‘Relation’ is not the right word here inasmuch as 
it implies a type of engagement between two discrete entities which 
maintain relative autonomy from one another. ‘Relationality’ thus 
comes a little closer to grasping the Deleuzian notion of an inter-
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connected, varying, flux of reciprocities between image and body which 
are conjoined in a continual process of ‘becoming’. Conceptually then, 
the task is not to presume the ontological primacy of discrete entities 
linked via a series of interconnections, but to grasp the interconnection 
rather as the ontological priority and as antecedent to the object-parts 
we tend to think of pre-existing such an interaction. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (2009) Anti-Oedipus is full of such examples: we have not an 
infant sucking at the breast, but rather the flow of the sucking-machine 
of breast-infant. A philosophy of becoming thus attempts to escape the 
dualism of thinking a ‘relation’ in subject-object terms; rather than the 
case of a baby sucking at the breast there is an emphasis on the 
‘interface area’ where the outline of the two connected forms starts to 
blur and become indistinct (i.e. the focus is now on the sucking-machine 
made out of subsidiary parts). 8  
Furthermore, rather than the presumption of static bounded 
entities whose nature is only temporarily affected by relations with 
other objects, the emphasis is now clearly on the doing rather than on 
the nature of the objects involved. The ontological focus is on the 
changing ‘becoming’ of what is being mutually-constituted in a 
relationality that is neither partial nor temporary but instead an on-
going and constantly varying element of the materiality in question. The 
reconceptualization Deleuze offers is at least twofold then: it avoids the 
division of a field of interacting bodies into discrete parts, firstly, and it 
places the emphasis on processes, ‘becomings’ that emerge ‘indivisibly 
between’ such bodies.  
It is for the above reasons that Coleman (2008) can claim that we 
need to “understand bodies not as a bounded subject that is separate 
from images but [instead] see the connections between humans and 
images as constituting a body” (p. 168). 9 This approach might shed a 
new light on the type of images we have been considering. The potency 
of these images lies with their ability to reproduce the abjected body 
not, or not only, as a representation, but as lived visceral response. Such 
an argument would support the contention that what is in question is 
not racism as product of discourse and representation, but instead a 
‘pre-discursive’ effect (indeed, affect), an “unstructured non-conscious 
experience” which engages the body directly as an intensity that is, 
citing Featherstone, “palpable, but difficult to decipher and articulate in 
language” (2010, p. 199). What this means, in short, is that types of 
affectivity that are themselves asignifying, outside the remit of discourse 
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and representation, might nonetheless play their part in substantiating 
passions of a decidedly political sort. 10 So, while I agree with the above 
theorists as to the asignifying potency of affects upon bodies, it is also 
worth stressing the degree to which such regimes of affect can be put to 
use in substantiating different and racist orders of embodiment, 
differential categories of humanity. We might say then that although 
affect emerges in a way that is not immediately ‘gentrified’, i.e. 
domesticated by discourse, this free-floating period of non-attachment 
does not typically last long. Such affective intensities are inevitably taken 
up within or aligned to some meaning structure, even if they are never 
fully encompassed within or exhausted by it. In this respect we need to 
take seriously Hemmings’s (2005) critique of “the contemporary 
fascination with affect as outside of social meaning” (p. 550). Wary of 
Massumi’s (2002) notion of the autonomy of affects and Sedgwick’s 
assertion of affective freedom, she notes:  
affect [typically] manifests precisely not as difference, but as 
central mechanism of social reproduction…affective responses 
[often] strengthen rather than challenge a dominant social 
order (p. 51). 
A scene not to be seen 
 
It is necessary here to briefly return to the case-study image discussed 
above. The Rapport’s publication of the image of Oderile Maponya (who 
was not of course identified as such in the image) led to a series of 
appalled reactions from the newspaper’s readership. The newspaper 
had to cancel its annual literary prize when a prominent sponsor 
withdrew its support for the award due to the publication of the 
photograph. It is worth considering in a little more detail the nature of 
this outrage. Did this scandal reflect the (justified) anger at the unethical 
and sensationalistic use of an image of a subject who, in the given 
context, could be afforded no dignity whatsoever? This was, no doubt, a 
part of the reason for the outcry. Did the moral indignation occasioned 
by this publication also have something to do with the fact that the 
image ‘carried things too far’, exemplifying in grotesque terms the 
abjection of black bodies in apartheid? Did the photograph expose a 
truth that apartheid ideology labored to conceal?  
Extending this argument: was the image so distressing because it 
showed so explicitly that which was omnipresent and yet typically 
undeclared, the ‘scene not to be seen’, i.e. precisely that which was best 
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left at the level of fantasy? The reaction to such a scandalous image is 
necessarily of course overdetermined; there are multiple – and 
historically-variable - reasons for the responses it provokes. I have 
already hinted at my own view: the disturbing charge stems at least in 
part from the fact that it rendered all too clearly a fantasmatic object of 
white apartheid subjectivity - the black body-in-pieces. The image is 
rightly considered ‘obscene’ in a precise sense. That is to say, it breaks 
the rules of (psychical and discursive) representation by picturing the 
social fantasy that usually exists beneath the surface in an implicit, 
assumed, imagined form. Such an image is not to be made explicit; if it 
is, one is confronted by what is most unacceptable, unpalatable about 
one’s own desire. The irony of the situation is of course that 
ideologically, the image would seem to fully support the apartheid 
regime, and in multiple ways. It is simultaneously a warning to terrorists 
(its implication: this is the fate you deserve); a sobering reminder to 
whites of why such opponents of the political system are to be feared; 
and an invocation of the object-status of the black body which may be 
depicted in such a mutilated state without the risk of white empathy. 
The lesson here, one often reiterated by Slavoj Žižek (1989),  is that by 
pushing ideology too far, identifying too strongly with its unspoken 
injunctions, one is able to subvert its appeal. 
 Apartheid entailed a destruction of black bodies. The black body-
in-pieces was, I think, a fantasmatic preoccupation of white apartheid 
South Africa, the correlate of a no less racist imaginary of the physical 
superiority, the indestructibility, the vitalism of black bodies. As already 
suggested, these two schemas need to be read together, as dynamically 
related, in the sense of Lacan’s twofold function of the fantasy so 
usefully illustrated by Žižek (1997). Firstly: fantasy1, the beatific or 
utopian imaginary that covers over a threat to my being, hiding from 
view any challenge to my narcissistic wholeness. Secondly: fantasy2, the 
disturbing scene that precisely pictures castration, depicting that which 
puts an end to my enjoyment, the wholeness of my being. The paradox 
of the situation in the context of the (body-in-pieces/indestructible 
body) ‘couplet’ of fantasies that we are discussing is that it is the 
disturbing image (the destroyed, suffering body) which presumably plays 
the role of the soothing fantasy1. It is this social fantasy which functions 
to hide the more threatening (yet less obviously troubling) fantasy2 of 
the immortal physicality of the black body.  
 
The present in the past still to come 
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In an essay that explores the multiple ethical dilemmas of photographic 
depictions of torture and war, Judith Butler (2009) cites Susan Sontag’s 
stark injunction: “Let the atrocious images haunt us” (p. 96). Sontag’s 
(1977) early work on photography has of course proved incredibly 
influential; her arguments have come to inform many of our 
commonplace views on the subject. One example is the idea that visual 
representations of suffering have become so routine in today’s mass-
media, that images of this sort no longer possess the power to rouse 
ethical passions. Despite such arguments, and her conviction that 
narrative proved a more effective means of developing sustained 
political commitments, Sontag (1977) nonetheless maintained that 
photography possess the immediacy necessary to most effectively 
convey the reality of human suffering. 
These views intersect with Butler’s own concerns with ‘grievable 
lives’, that is, with the question of whose pain, life, death and suffering 
effectively counts as opposed to that of others and under what 
conditions. In an inspired reference to Barthes’ (1999) elegiac essay on 
the nature and impact of photography, Camera Lucida, she points out 
that “The photograph relays less the present moment than [that of]…a 
time in which “this will have been”” (p. 97). Although Butler does not 
make this connection, this time of the future anterior is also, for Lacan, 
the time of Freud’s nachträglichkeit. It is, in other words, the psychical 
temporality of the retroactive, Freud’s ‘deferred action’, which disrupts 
linear or chronological time. Historical events, from this perspective, 
remain latent, effectively incomplete, subject to the contingencies of 
later circumstances through which they might be reactivated in 
unexpected ways. 
What Butler takes from Barthes (1999) is a subtle appreciation of 
the concurrence of two temporal modes presented by the photograph, 
particularly, although not exclusively, in the case of portraits, pictures of 
people, indeed, of bodies. There is, on the one hand, the dimension of 
what has been (photograph as record of history), that is, a type of 
absolute pastness. On the other, there is the dimension of the constant 
present (photograph as frozen segment of time) about to spill over into 
the future, the aspect thus of what will be. The conjunction of these 
factors, of the what has been and the what will be gives us the future 
anterior of this will have been. Or, extrapolating to the case of human 
subjects, we have the declarative sense of ‘he or she will have been’. 
This is a paradoxical tense which concedes the importance of the past 
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whilst simultaneously opening it up for alternative re-makings of the 
future. In other words, it accords a subject a history whilst also 
underscoring the potentialities of the present, and does so by virtue of 
the supposition of an as of yet undefined future. 
How the temporality of the photographic record anticipates the 
inevitability of death is crucial here; mortality is important in the 
accounts of Sontag and Barthes alike. “Photographs” says Sontag, “state 
the…vulnerability of lives heading toward their own destruction” (1977, 
p. 66). Furthermore: “this link between photography and death haunts 
all photography of people” (p. 64). Likewise for Barthes, photographs of 
people, once placed within the inevitable continuum of history, 
necessarily tell of death in the future. Every photography, says Butler 
(2009), paraphrasing Barthes, is this catastrophe of death, “installing and 
soliciting  perspective on the absolute pastness of a life” (p. 97).  
One starts to appreciate thus the importance that the link 
between mortality and photography, along with the aligned idea of a 
double temporality, has for Butler’s concerns with the conditions of 
grievability. In other words, the latent ethical dimension of the 
photograph, of the haunting image, is brought to fruition through the 
function of retroaction, through the retroactivity of double temporality. 
Furthermore, Butler asks: “does this quality of “absolute pastness” 
counter the forces of melancholy and open up a more explicit form of 
grieving?” (p. 97).  
 
Is this quality of “absolute pastness” that is conferred on a 
living being…precisely the quality of grievability? To confirm 
that a life was, even within the life itself, is to underscore that 
a life is a grievable life. In this sense the photograph, through 
its relation to the future anterior, instates grievability (p. 97) 
 
As Butler rightly notes, Sontag’s insistence that “the atrocious images 
haunt us” allows for the possibility that we may refuse such a troubling 
relation to history, or that, given our particular historical and discursive 
location, this haunting may be unable to reach us. So, evidently there 
are situations within which we are not haunted, when – and the original 
circumstances of the Rapport photograph would seem to attest to this – 
to all intents and purposes, there has not been an aching loss, the public 
commemoration of a valued life lost. If we are shaken, haunted by a 
photograph, then it is because “the photograph acts on us in part 
through outliving the life it documents” (p. 98). We may put this simply 
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by saying that the photograph is evidence of a life, and yet, by its ability 
to freeze a moment of a life progressing toward death, it represents also 
the possibility that this life will, at some future point, be reflected upon, 
its meaning and value revisited, reconsidered. As such 
 
the photograph is linked through its “tense” to the grievability 
of a life, anticipating and performing that grievability…the 
anticipation of the past underwrites the photograph’s 
distinctive capacity to establish grievability as a precondition 
of a knowable human life (p. 98). 
  
One may argue of course that the image of Oderile Maponya pushes this 
argument to, and beyond, breaking point. Can such an image, one that 
reduces its subject to state of abject corporeality seriously be thought to 
‘institute a mode of acknowledgement’? The answer I think is yes – and 
we should bear in mind that Sontag (1977) is concerned with precisely 
atrocious images – although there is a different facet of 
acknowledgement that will need be necessary if this is to be the case.  
Butler’s revitalization of Sontag’s ethical imperative puts the stress 
on extended temporality, on the factors of repetition and non-
forgetting, that is, on the inability to leave something behind. However, 
there are other possibilities for intervening within, experimenting with, 
Sontag’s imperative, that return us to the issues of bodily affect. What if 
we stress instead the first key term of this injunction, focusing thus on 
that which is atrocious, or, by extrapolation, obscene, which is of course 
precisely the facet of social fantasy I have emphasized above. The 
imperative now highlights the importance of non-denial, of not turning 
away from the social fantasy which, after all, is sustained precisely 
because it is never spelt out, and kept instead at one step’s remove.  
Elided, disavowed, and thus secured; this is the very condition of 
social fantasy: never openly declared, yet for that very reason, a 
constant cultural presence. This presents us with the possibility of an 
odd ethical reversal. That one is appalled by an image – intensely 
affected by it - and wishes it to be removed, censored, may itself be a 
defense against one’s own desire, a means of keeping that image, or, 
more importantly, the associated fantasy, intact. Taken in this sense, the 
injunction now comes closer to the directive to know – or better yet, to 
claim – your fantasy, your obscenity, and, moreover, your enjoyment. 
And this is an altogether different proposition from the imperative to be 
haunted, to be appalled, or indeed, however tacitly, to repeat. 
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1
  In speaking of a ‘social fantasy’ I mean to imply a fantasy thoroughly conditioned 
by and the result of prevailing socio-historical conditions; such a fantasy does not 
exist outside of the political context in which it occurs. 
 
2
 See for example Krog, Mpolweni & Ratele’s (2009) discussion of the footage 
broadcast on SABC showing the remains of the ‘Gugulethu Seven’ and subsequent 
images of security police officers posing “with hunter’s pride alongside their 
‘trophies’” (p. 194). 
 
3
 Fanon’s famous description of being apprehended by the white racist gaze includes 
an account of his natural corporeal schema crumbling, being replaced by a “racial 
epidermal schema”: 
 
[C]ompletely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the 
white man…I took myself far off from my own presence…and 
made myself an object. What else could it be for me but an 
amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that splattered my whole 
body with black blood? (Fanon, 1986, p. 112). 
 
4
 Drawing on Fanon (1986) is likewise instructive in this respect inasmuch as his 
analysis similarly refuses to reduce phenomena of political oppression to naturally-
occurring psychical operations. 
 
5
 The same charge could be laid against the current paper: rather than critiquing or 
apprehending the violence of the image, my engagement here plays its part in 
extending it. 
 
6
 To avoid any confusion: the theorists of affect cited above do not as a rule 
introduce psychoanalytic vocabulary – this is my own doing, by means of which I 
hope to facilitate a correspondence of ideas between the two theoretical domains. 
 
7 In this section I have images of the body in mind when speaking of the relation 
between images and the body.  
 
8
 One should note furthermore that the subsidiary parts may not be drawn along the 
lines of division we are most intuitively familiar with. Deleuze’s intervention is one 
which causes us to reconsider were one places the lines of ontological division: what 
had been discrete objects are now arts (subsidiary constituents, we might say); what 
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had been clear lines of division between objects are now interface areas, zones of 
flow, of interconnection, that are of primary ontological concern. 
 
9
  It is worth noting here an important convergence in respect of Lacanian and 
Deleuzian theory. Lacan’s (2006) mirror-stage is concerned with a body-image, an 
image which enables a form of ‘corporeal mapping’ and that is as such a necessary 
vehicle of mediation in the always to some degree virtual task of assuming a body. 
More starkly put: in Lacanian theory the subject does not ‘have’ a body – in any 
significant sense - without the mediation of an image, an image, furthermore, that is 
always in some or other state of flux or variation, which constantly needs to be 
updated, ‘refreshed’, and which is never the exact, distortion-less, replica of the 
subject’s physicality. In Lacanian theory then, images and bodies can thus be said to 
be ‘spliced’ into one another. Images serve as a template of sorts, as an organizing 
schema for the task of accommodating to a body. The ineffable ‘real’ of the body’s 
corporeality, in turn, constantly disrupts such idealizing schemas of integration and 
cohesion. The notion of ‘inter-spliced’ images and bodies is as such a perfectly 
coherent research topic in Lacanian psychoanalysis – it is, as suggested above, also a 
key Fanonion problematic – even if a Deleuzian ontology might be said to radicalize 
this notion by means of its emphasis on becoming.  
There are other notable convergences between these theories. Take for 
example how Coleman (2012), following Deleuze, thinks the virtual, as the 
intangible, immaterial or ‘not-yet’ aspect of actual or concrete everyday life. Such a 
definition overlaps significantly with the notion of the fantasmatic as I have deployed 
it above. Both terms privilege the visual dimension of the image (in Lacanian terms, 
the terrain of the imaginary, in Freudian vernacular, that of ‘the Other scene’) and 
entail a relation at once suspended from and yet intimately related to ‘the actual’. Of 
course, the great benefit of a Deleuzian ontology is that its emphasis on materiality 
and – certainly within his work with Guattari – its political ethos avoids the prospect 
of psychical reductionism that so often underlies references to the psychoanalytic 
notion of fantasy. 
 
 
10
 The role of affect as simultaneously outside of and yet supportive of racist 
discourse and ideology is a topic I have addressed in some detail elsewhere (see the 
discussion of ‘pre-discursive’ racism in Hook, 2011). 
 
